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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5834 
CITY OF TROY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5834 - 2 -
Included: Assessor; Assistant to City Clerk (Legislative Aide); Assistant 
Operations Manager; City Water Plant Operator; City Auditor; City 
Engineer; Commissioner of Planning and Community 
Development; Deputy City Clerk; Deputy Comptroller for Financial 
Operations; Grants Writing Specialist; Personnel Associate; 
Recreation Director; Superintendent of Water and Sewer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
J 
KIl^^K, 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
^ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28828 
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (LORI M. SMITH of counsel), 
for Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (ALLISON SARA 
BILLER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Michael Goldstein 
(Goldstein) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper 
practice charge filed by Goldstein on or about December 21, 2008, as amended, 
alleging that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The ALJ granted UFT's unopposed motion to dismiss the charge based upon 
Goldstein's failure to respond to the ALJ's directive that he file an affidavit by August 6, 
2009 explaining his absence at the scheduled hearing on July 29, 2009. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Goldstein contends that the ALJ's decision contains errors of 
fact in its description of his communications with respect to the scheduled hearing date. 
In support of his exceptions, Goldstein attaches a copy of an email, dated July 28, 
2009, which he claims he sent requesting an adjournment of the July 29, 2009 hearing. 
The UFT supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ dismissing the charge. 
BACKGROUND 
The procedural history of the charge is fully set forth in the ALJ's decision.1 It is 
repeated here only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
In response to a notice scheduling the hearing on his charge for May 28, 2009, 
Goldstein submitted a written request seeking leave from the ALJ to participate in the 
hearing telephonically from his residence in Florida. UFT objected to Goldstein's 
request. It also requested an adjournment of the hearing due to a scheduling conflict. 
On May 22, 2009, the ALJ issued a letter denying Goldstein's request to appear 
telephonically at the hearing and adjourned the hearing until July 29, 2009. The letter 
stated, in part: 
Failure to appear at the hearing may constitute grounds for 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading. Any request for an 
adjournment must be made reasonably in advance, in 
writing, indicating the basis therefor and the position of each 
party thereon. 
1
 UFT (Goldstein), 42 PERB 1J4565 (2009). 
2
 UFT's attorney was scheduled to appear at a hearing in another administrative forum 
on May 28, 2009. 
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On May 27, 2009, the ALJ sent a letter to Goldstein in response to his telephone 
inquiry about possible alternative means to avoid being physically present at the 
scheduled hearing on July 29, 2009. In her letter, the ALJ stated, inter alia, that the 
hearing would proceed on the scheduled date unless the parties were able to stipulate 
to the record. In addition, she directed Goldstein to cease attempting to engage in ex 
parte communications with her, and to henceforth communicate with her in writing with 
copies sent to the other parties. 
During the two days preceding the scheduled hearing, the ALJ attempted to 
contact Goldstein, including faxing him a letter on July 28, 2009, aimed at confirming that 
he would be present at the July 29, 2009 hearing. The ALJ did not receive a response 
from Goldstein and Goldstein did not attend the hearing. In a letter, dated July 29, 2009, 
the ALJ directed Goldstein to file an affidavit by August 6, 2009 explaining his reasons for 
failing to appear at the scheduled hearing. Goldstein did not respond. 
On August 26, 2009, UFT filed a motion to dismiss the charge based upon 
Goldstein's non-appearance at the July 29, 2009 hearing, and his failure to comply with 
the ALJ's directive to submit an affidavit explaining his failure to appear at the hearing. 
Goldstein did not oppose UFT's motion. 
DISCUSSION 
Goldstein argues in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in concluding that he failed 
to respond to her repeated efforts to confirm that he would be attending the July 29, 2009 
hearing. In support of his exceptions, Goldstein has submitted a copy of an email he 
claims he sent on July 28, 2009 requesting an adjournment of the scheduled hearing. 
Section 213.2 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) limits our review of the ALJ's 
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determination to the record before her.3 Our review of the record demonstrates that the 
ALJ did not have Goldstein's July 28, 2009 email before her when she issued her 
decision. Goldstein sent his email to an email address of a PERB secretary without 
notice to the other parties. In response to the ALJ's July 29, 2009 letter seeking an 
affidavit explaining his failure to attend the hearing, Goldstein did not submit a copy of 
his email to the ALJ. Therefore, we are foreclosed from considering his email in support 
of his exceptions. 
In the alternative, even if we considered Goldstein's email, we would conclude 
that it does not form the basis for reversing the ALJ, in whole or in part. 
Section 212.4(b) of the Rules states: 
The hearing will not be adjourned unless good and 
sufficient grounds are established by the requesting 
party, who shall file with the administrative law judge 
an original and three copies of the application, on 
notice to all other parties, setting forth the factual 
circumstances of the application and the previously 
ascertained position of the other parties to the 
application. The failure of a party to appear at the 
hearing may, in the discretion of the administrative 
law judge, constitute ground for dismissal of the 
absent party's pleading. 
Two months before the scheduled hearing, Goldstein received explicit directions 
from the ALJ stating that a request for an adjournment must be made reasonably in 
advance of the hearing, setting forth the basis-for the request, and on notice to the 
other parties. Despite these instructions, Goldstein's email was sent on the afternoon 
before the scheduled hearing, without stating any factual basis for the request, and 
without notice to the other parties. Furthermore, he took no other action to ensure that 
3
 CSEA (Paganini), 36 PERB fl3006 (2003). 
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the ALJ and the other parties were aware of his adjournment request. 
It is well-settled that the failure of a charging party to prosecute a charge 
constitutes grounds for dismissal of a charge.4 In the present case, Goldstein's last 
minute email, along with his failure to file an affidavit in response to the ALJ's directive, 
and his failure to respond to UFT's motion to dismiss, demonstrate a clear and 
calculated decision by him to disregard prescribed procedures for pursuing his charge 
so as to constitute an abandonment of his claim against UFT. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Goldstein's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
4
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Greenberg), 16 PERB 
H3067 (1983); Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB P060 (1995); IBT, Local 237 (Jouldach), 
34 PERB H3010(2001). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SULLIVAN COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NOS. C-5810 & CP-1163 
LOCAL 445, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
JACKSON LEWIS LLP (THOMAS P. MCDONOUGH of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
SAPIR & FRUMKIN LLP (WILLIAM D. FRUMKIN of counsel), 
for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Sullivan County 
Community College (College) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) dismissing a petition for decertification (Case No. C-5810) 
and a petition for unit clarification and/or unit placement (Case No. CP-1163) filed by the 
College seeking to fragment employees working in non-professional titles at the College 
from a County-wide unit represented by Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(IBT).1 
The Director dismissed Case No. C-5810 on the grounds that the decertification 
petition was not timely under §201.3(d) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules) and that the 
College may not file a decertification petition during the period set forth in §201.3(e) of the 
Rules. In addition, the Director dismissed CP-1163 on the ground that such a petition 
cannot be utilized to fragment titles from an existing bargaining unit. 
142 PERB H4003 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the College asserts that the fragmentation of non-professional 
employees at the College from the County-wide unit is appropriate and that, as a matter of 
policy, it should not be barred from filing a representation petition seeking fragmentation 
following the expiration of the last collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) between 
the County of Sullivan (County) and IBT under §201.3(e) of the Rules. IBT supports the 
Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
In 1986, IBT was certified as the exclusive representative of a County-wide 
bargaining unit that includes employees working in non-professional titles at the College.2 
The most recent agreement between the County and IBT, which expired on December 31, 
2007, recognized IBT as the exclusive representative of a unit of employees including 
approximately three dozen non-professional employees at the College. 
On May 28, 2008, the College filed two petitions seeking to fragment the non-
professional employees from the County-wide unit. Following receipt of the petitions, the 
Director issued notices informing the parties that Case No. C-5810 was untimely pursuant 
to §201.3 of the Rules, and Case No. CP-1163 was deficient because a unit clarification 
petition is not a proper procedural mechanism for the removal of titles from a unit. In 
response to the deficiency notices, both parties filed supplemental pleadings with the 
Director asserting facts with respect to the relationship between the College and County 
during the last round of negotiations, which led to a memorandum of agreement 
2
 County of Sullivan, 19 PERB P000.38 (1986). ; 
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(memorandum), dated November 18, 2008, between the County and IBT. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that the requirements for the filing and processing of a certification 
and/or decertification petition under our Rules are strictly applied.3 
Pursuant to §201.3(d) of the Rules, public employers, employee organizations or 
public employees have a right to file a petition for certification or decertification during the 
30-day period before the expiration of the period of unchallenged representation status 
under §208.2 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). It is undisputed that the 
College's petition was not filed prior to the expiration of the window period set forth in 
§201.3(d) of the Rules. Therefore, the College's petition is untimely under that Rule.4 
Section 201.3(e) of the Rules expressly limits who may file a petition for certification 
or decertification following the expiration of an agreement. The only parties that may file a 
certification or decertification petition 120 days following the expiration of an agreement 
under §201.3(e) of the Rules are an employee organization other than the incumbent 
employee organization; or one or more public employees.5 
3
 See, County of Dutchess and Dutchess County Sheriff, 26 PERB 1J3080 (1993); City 
University of New York, 20 PERB 1J4045 (1987), affd, 20 PERB 1J3069 (1987). 
4
 Therefore, we do not need to reach the issue whether a public employer, which is 
arguably a component of a joint public employer, may file its own petition seeking 
fragmentation under §201.3(d) of the Rules. 
5
 The Rule states: A petition for certification or decertification may be filed by an employee 
organization other than the recognized or certified employee organization and a petition for 
decertification may be filed by one or more public employees, if no new agreement is 
negotiated, 120 days subsequent to the expiration of a written agreement between the 
public employer and the recognized or certified employee organization or, if the agreement 
does not expire at the end of the employer's fiscal year, then 120 days subsequent to the 
end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the termination date of such agreement. 
Thereafter, such a petition may be filed until a new agreement is executed. Such a petition 
shall be supported by a showing of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees in the 
unit already in existence or alleged to be appropriate by the petitioner, (emphasis added) 
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In support of its exceptions, the College contends that its petition should be deemed 
timely because Board precedent supports the fragmentation of employees at a County-
sponsored community college from a County-wide unit.6 However, the arguable merit of the 
College's petition is not relevant to determining whether §201.3(e) of the Rules permits it to 
file a decertification petition during the applicable period. 
Similarly, we are not persuaded by the College's argument that the petition should be 
treated as timely because it is a distinct legal entity from the County, and it did not have an 
opportunity to participate in the most recent negotiations between the County and the IBT 
resulting in the November 2008 memorandum. The first part of this argument is a necessary 
element to the College's contention that employees in non-professional titles at the College 
should be fragmented because they are employed by a joint public employer comprised of 
the County and the College. The second aspect of the argument focuses on the 
relationship between the two alleged components of that joint public employer. Neither 
element of its argument, however, places the College within the category of organizations 
that may file a decertification or certification petition pursuant to §201.3(e) of the Rules. 
Next, we examine the College's policy argument for treating its petition as timely. In 
Greece Central School District,7 we set forth the applicable policy underlying the 
prohibition against a public employer filing a decertification petition pursuant to §201.3(e) 
of the Rules: 
6
 See, County of Jefferson and Jefferson County Community Coll, 26 PERB fl3010 (1993), 
confd, Jefferson County v Pub Empl Rel Bd, 204 AD2d 1001, 27 PERB 1J7010 (4th Dept 
1994), Iv denied, 84 NY2d 804, 27 PERB fl7014 (1994); Genesee Community Coll and 
County of Genesee, 24 PERB P017 (1991). See also, Niagara County Community Coll 
and County of Niagara, 23 PERB 1J4052 (1990). 
7
 18 PERB ^3033(1985). 
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The policy underlying Rule 201.3(e) is that the public 
employer should be under major pressure to conclude an 
agreement to succeed one that has expired, and it should 
not be able to evade this pressure by filing a petition. The 
potential problem of unit employees being represented by an 
employee organization that is no longer of their choosing 
may be remedied by an appropriate petition, but not one 
brought by the public employer.8 
Contrary to the College's argument, this policy rationale is equally applicable to a joint 
public employer under §201.6(b) of the Act or a component of that joint public employer 
seeking fragmentation. The fact that the College did not participate in the negotiations 
leading to the November 2008 memorandum does not eliminate the exclusion contained 
in §201.3(e) of the Act with respect to who may file a petition following the expiration of an 
agreement. In addition, even if a timely petition seeking fragmentation had been filed and 
granted, the certified or recognized representative of the fragmented unit would negotiate 
with a joint public employer composed of the County and the College and not just the 
College.9 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Director's decision is affirmed and the 
petitions are dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefko 
' / , , V Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. G6le, Member 
Supra note 7, 18 PERB P033 at 3067. 
Supra note 6. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 891, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28706 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK LIPTON LLP (NEIL D. LIPTON of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (SETH J. BLAU of counsel), for Respondent 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a motion, dated October 29, 2009, by the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) 
requesting an extension of time to file exceptions, pursuant to §213.4 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dated 
September 25, 2009, on an improper practice charge filed by Local 891, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Local 891). The District's motion for an 
extension of time is premised upon an assertion of law office failure. Local 891 opposes 
the District's motion. 
Case No. U-28706 -2-
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 27, 2008, Local 891 filed an improper practice charge alleging that 
the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally modified a past practice by reducing the number of parking permits 
for Custodian Engineers in the bargaining unit represented by Local 891. The District 
filed a timely answer to the charge on or about November 21, 2008 asserting various 
affirmative defenses. A hearing was held before the ALJ on March 23, 2009 during 
which both Local 891 and the District presented evidence. Following the filing of post-
hearing briefs by both parties in mid-July 2009, the ALJ issued his decision denying the 
District's motion to dismiss the charge and concluding that the District violated §209-
a. 1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally terminated the past practice of providing parking 
permits to Local 891 unit members. 
FACTS 
In support of its motion, the District has submitted affidavits from four District 
attorneys including David Brodsky (Brodsky), the Director of the District's Office of 
Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining (OLR). The affidavits set forth the facts that 
form the basis for the District's assertion of extraordinary circumstances under §213.4 of 
our Rules premised on law office failure. 
OLR maintains a centralized administrative procedure for the receipt and the 
internal distribution of administrative and arbitral decisions. Upon receipt of a decision, 
OLR administrative staff members are required to forward the decision directly to the 
OLR clerical employee who functions as the tribunal administrator. After the tribunal 
administrator copies and scans a decision, it is then distributed to OLR's Deputy 
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Director and Supervising Attorney Robert E. Waters (Waters), and the staff attorney 
who represented the District at the hearing. After the decision has been reviewed by 
Waters and/or the staff attorney, it is then forwarded to OLR Director Brodsky.1 
In the present case, the District's affidavits reveal that after the tribunal 
administrator received the ALJ's decision, it was date stamped October 2, 2009 and 
placed in a folder for filing.2 However, the tribunal administrator did not follow OLR 
office procedures by distributing the ALJ's decision to Waters or Seth J. Blau (Blau), the 
staff attorney who represented the District before the ALJ.3 It is undisputed that Waters 
and Blau did not become aware of the ALJ's decision until October 29, 2009. 
In mid-October 2009, Local 891 President Troeller telephoned Brodsky in 
response to a memorandum issued by Bartholomew Coumane (Cournane), the Deputy 
Director of the District's Division of School Facilities, which referenced off-site parking 
permits. During their conversation, Troeller asked Brodsky whether the District intended 
on challenging the ALJ's decision. According to Brodsky, he explicitly told Troeller that 
he had not seen the ALJ's decision and that he was unaware that a decision had been 
issued4 In contrast, Troeller asserts that it "appeared perfectly plain to me" that during 
1
 Affidavit of Robert E. Waters, W - 7 . 
2
 In his affidavit in opposition to the District's motion, Local 891 President Robert J. 
Troeller (Troeller) states he received an electronic copy of the ALJ's decision from Local 
891's attorney on October 2, 2009. Affidavit of Robert J. Troeller, fl3. 
3
 The District states that it is unable to submit an affidavit from the tribunal administrator 
because she is entitled to representation, pursuant to Civ Serv Law §75.2, during 
questioning about her handling of the ALJ's decision. 
4
 Affidavit of David Brodsky, 1J5. 
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the telephone conversation Brodsky was aware of the ALJ's decision.5 Nevertheless, it 
is undisputed that Brodsky told Troellerthat the District had every intention of 
challenging an ALJ decision that was adverse to the District.6 Following the 
conversation, Brodsky contacted Blau to inquire whether the ALJ had issued a decision. 
In response, Blau told Brodsky that he had not received a decision and that he was 
unaware that the ALJ had issued a decision.7 
On October 29, 2009, Blau received an email from a New York City Assistant 
Corporation Counsel referencing the ALJ's decision. In response to a request from 
Blau, the Assistant Corporation Counsel emailed him an electronic copy of the decision 
in the mid-afternoon.8 On the same day, Waters and the District's Executive Agency 
Counsel Russell J. Platzek (Platzek) were present at the law offices of Spivak Lipton, 
LLP, the attorneys for Local 891. During an afternoon colloquy with Neil Lipton (Lipton), 
following a negotiations session between the parties on an unrelated matter, Waters 
and Platzek learned, for the first time, of the issuance of the ALJ's decision in the 
present case and another ALJ decision favora,ble to the District, dated September 30, 
2009, in an unrelated improper practice case between the parties.9 As a professional 
5
 Affidavit of Robert J. Troeller, 1]6. 
6
 Affidavit of David Brodsky, 1J5; Affidavit of Robert J. Troeller, 1]5. In fact, the District 
had already commenced litigation challenging an arbitration award with respect to 
parking privileges for District supervisors and administrators. 
7
 Affidavit of Seth J. Blau, V 0; Affidavit of David Brodsky, 1J8. 
8
 Affidavit of Seth J. Blau, 1J11. 
9
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 42 PERB ^4569 (2009). 
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courtesy, Lipton provided Waters with a copy of the ALJ's decision. Thereafter, Platzek 
returned to the District's office and delivered a hard copy of the decision to Blau. 
After Local 891 declined the District's October 29, 2009 request to extend its time 
to file exceptions, the District filed its motion with the Board. 
DISCUSSION 
Our Rules require that exceptions be filed within 15 working days after the receipt 
of a decision and that requests for any extension must be filed with the Board before the 
expiration of that time period.10 However, the Board has discretionary authority under 
§213.4 of the Rules to extend the time during which a party may request an extension of 
time to file exceptions upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.11 To establish 
extraordinary circumstances, a party must present specific and detailed facts 
demonstrating that the failure to make a timely request for an extension was not the 
result of mere neglect or burdens connected with other obligations.12 The high standard 
for establishing extraordinary circumstances is consistent with our strict application of 
the timeframes set forth in our Rules. 
In Auburn Industrial Development Authority,™ we held that a party had 
demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of additional time to 
10
 Rules, §§213.2(a) and 213.4. 
11
 Onondaga Community Coll, 11 PERB P008 (1978). 
12
 See, Westbury Union Free Sch Dist (Handy), 12 PERB P107 (1979); UFT (Gottlieb), 
13 PERB TI3101 (1980); Bd of Educ of the City of New York (Bamett), 16 PERB P051 
(1983); UFT (Thompson), 18 PERB P014 (1985); CSEA (Adams), 28 PERB P054 
(1995). 
13
 15 PERB H3075 (1982). 
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request an extension of time to file exceptions. In that case, the party's motion was 
supported by an affidavit that set forth detailed facts demonstrating that the original 
attorney assigned to prepare exceptions had become disabled during the period in 
which a request for an extension can be made under the Rules. Due to the attorney's 
disabled condition, the case was reassigned to a new attorney who made a prompt 
request for an extension of time after he had reviewed the file over a weekend. 
In opposition to the District's motion, Local 891 relies upon our decision in City of 
Albany u In City of Albany, we granted a motion to dismiss the respondent's exceptions 
because they were filed beyond the specific date set by the Board, as the result of an 
earlier request by the respondent for an extension, and because the exceptions were 
not accompanied by proof of service upon the other party. Although respondent 
asserted that its mailroom had failed to mail the exceptions in a timely manner, we 
concluded that those bare allegations alone were not sufficient to establish 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of an additional extension of time to 
file exceptions. Our decision was subsequently confirmed by the courts. 
In the present case, under the specific facts and circumstances established by 
the District's affidavits, we conclude that the District has demonstrated extraordinary 
circumstances warranting the grant of additional time to file exceptions pursuant to 
§213.4 of the Rules. The affidavits demonstrate that the District's attorneys did not 
become aware of the ALJ's decision until October 29, 2009, and filed the District's 
motion for an extension within hours of that discovery. The District's lack of awareness 
14
 23 PERB 1J3027 (1990) confirmed sub nom. City of Albany v Newman, 24 PERB 
U7004 (Sup Ct Albany County 1991), affd, 181 AD2d 953, 25 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dept 
1992). 
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of the ALJ's decision was the direct result of a breakdown in OLR's established 
administrative procedure for the distribution of decisions, and not the result of any form 
of neglect, omission or delays by its attorneys. The fact that the District learned from 
Local 891, on October 29, 2009, of the issuance of another decision in an unrelated 
case underscores the breakdown in the OLR distribution system. 
We are not persuaded by Local 891's argument that the motion should be denied 
because the District failed to submit an affidavit from its tribunal administrator explaining 
her conduct. The record establishes that the District is in the midst of conducting an 
investigation into the administrative breakdown. It did not submit a statement from the 
tribunal administrator in support of its m.otion because she is a potential subject of 
discipline and, pursuant to Civ Serv Law §75.2, she is entitled to representation during 
questioning about her handling of the ALJ's decision. As a result, her interrogation did 
not take place prior to the District filing its motion, supporting affidavits and reply papers. 
Similarly, we reject Local 891's assertion that the mid-October, 2009 
conversation between Brodsky and Troeller should have triggered an earlier District 
investigation into whether the ALJ had issued his decision. Troeller's affidavit sets forth 
only his impression that Brodsky was aware of the issuance of the ALJ's decision. It is 
not disputed that during their conversation, Troeller did not state that a decision had 
been issued. In response to the conversation, however, Brodsky took the reasonable 
and prudent step of inquiring with Blau about the status of the case. In response, Blau 
informed Brodsky that he had not received a decision. Based upon the District's 
improper practice caseload, which we take administrative notice of, we conclude that 
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the District was not obligated, at that time, to take affirmative steps aimed at 
determining whether an ALJ's decision had been issued. 
Finally, we reject Local 891's reliance on precedent under CPLR §2005 that 
requires a party asserting law office failure to establish the merits of its claim or 
defense. In City of Albany,'15 the court specifically rejected the argument that CPLR 
§2005 is applicable to PERB procedures. 
IT IS, THEREOFRE, ORDERED that the District's exceptions16 will be timely if 
filed with the Board on or before January 14, 2010 with proof of service upon Local 
891 17 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
//vcnn*—*" 
Jerome Lefkq^itz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cofe, Member 
15
 Supra note 14. 
16
 Neither party shall submit or cite to evidence outside the administrative record before 
the ALJ in support of, or in response to, the exceptions filed by the District. 
Board Member Hite took no part. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Niagara Charter School 
(NCS) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, dated July 18, 2007, filed by the Niagara Charter School Instructional Staff 
Association, Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association/NYSUT/AFT, alleging that NCS 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when NCS 
refused to acknowledge the charging party as the collective negotiation representative 
of NCS instructional staff and when it refused requests by the charging party to 
commence collective negotiations for a first contract. 
Following submission of the case on a stipulation of facts, the ALJ issued a 
decision1 concluding that the charging party is the collective negotiation representative of 
142 PERB ^14519(2009). 
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NCS instructional staff, as a matter of law, pursuant to the express terms of New York 
Charter Schools Act of 19982 (Charter Schools Act) and that NCS violated §209-a. 1 (d) of 
the Act when it refused requests to commence collective negotiations. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, NCS contends that the ALJ erred when she concluded that: a) the 
charge raises a case or controversy under the Act; b) the recognition and certification 
provisions of the Act are inapplicable to NCS instructional employees; c) NCS instructional 
employees are represented by the charging party, as a matter of law, pursuant to Charter 
Schools Act, Education Law §2854(3)(b~1); and d) Charter Schools Act, Education Law 
§2854(3)(b-1), does not violate the United States and New York State Constitutions. The 
charging party supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
) arguments, we remand the case to the ALJ for further processing aimed at clarifying the 
record with respect to the employee organization that asserts representational rights 
pursuant to Charter Schools Act, Education Law §2854(3)(b-1), and the right to engage 
in collective negotiations pursuant to §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
FACTS 
The following facts are based upon the terms of the parties' stipulation of facts. 
In August 2006, NCS commenced operations with an enrollment of 264 students. 
In November 2006, a New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) representative wrote 
NCS stating that, because NCS has a student enrollment in excess of 250 students, the 
same employee organization that represents similar employees in the school district 
where NCS is located, represents NCS instructional staff pursuant to Education Law 
J 2
 L. 1998, c. 4; Education Law §2850, et seq. 
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§2854(3)(b-1). 
In December 2006, two NYSUT representatives met with NCS instructional 
employees and stated to them that, inter alia, the "Niagara Charter School Instructional 
Staff Association, Niagara-Wheatfield Teachers Association/NYSUT/AFT (Association) 
represented the instructional staff at Niagara Wheatfield School District, and that, 
therefore, under the statute the Association was automatically the representative of the 
instructional staff of NCS in a separate bargaining unit."3 This position was reiterated in 
January and February memoranda from NYSUT representatives to NCS, including the 
president of the "Association," requesting the commencement of collective negotiations. 
NCS asserts that NYSUT does not represent the instructional employees. In an 
April 2007 letter, NCS informed a NYSUT representative that it had serious concerns 
about agreeing to the prior requests because of a belief that the grant of recognition 
would violate the Act and may violate rights guaranteed by the United States and New 
York State Constitutions.4 In response, NYSUT representatives sent NCS a May 2007 
memorandum reiterating that the Association represents NCS instructional employees, 
that it seeks to commence negotiations, and that it would file an improper practice 
charge if NCS refused to commence negotiations.5 
The Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO has not 
filed a representation petition, pursuant to PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), seeking to 
represent NCS instructional employees. In addition, it has not presented a showing of 
3
 Joint Exhibit, fl8. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 1, p.2. 
5
 There were other written, electronic and oral communications between NYSUT and 
NCS over the disputed issues between December 2006 and May 2007. Joint Exhibit 1, 
1114. 
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interest pursuant to the Rules and does not claim to have majority status among NCS 
instructional employees. There has not been a representation election for a unit of NCS 
instructional employees, and NCS refuses to agree to commence negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
This case presents the Board with its first opportunity to examine and apply the 
employee organization representation provision codified in the Charter Schools Act.6 
Education Law §2854(3)(b-1) provides that when a particular charter school has . 
an enrollment of more than 250 students, an incumbent employee organization 
representing similar employees in the school district where the charter school is located 
shall be deemed the representative of a separate negotiation unit of similar employees 
of the charter school. Specifically, the law states: 
[t]he employees of a charter school that is not a conversion 
from an existing public school shall not be deemed members 
of any existing collective bargaining unit representing 
employees of the school district in which the charter school 
is located, and the charter school and its employees shall 
not be subject to any existing collective bargaining 
agreement between the school district and its employees. 
Provided, however, that (i) if the student enrollment of the 
charter school on the first day on which the charter school 
commences student instruction exceeds two hundred fifty or 
if the average daily student enrollment of such school 
exceeds two hundred fifty students at any point during the 
first two years after the charter school commences student 
instruction, all employees of the school who are eligible for 
representation under [the Act] shall be deemed to be 
represented in a separate negotiating unit at the charter 
school by the same employee organization, if any, that 
represents like employees in the school district in which such 
charter school is located (emphasis added); (ii) the 
provisions of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph may be 
6
 In Niagara Charter School, 40 PERB H6603 (2007), affd, 41 PERB 1J6501 (2008), we 
affirmed the dismissal of a related NCS petition seeking a declaratory ruling pursuant to 
§210 of the Rules seeking an analysis of the interplay between provisions of the Act and 
the provisions of the Charter School Act. Our dismissal was on technical grounds based 
upon the purposes of a declaratory ruling under the Rules. 
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waived in up to ten charters issued on the recommendation 
of the charter entity set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision 
three of section twenty-eight hundred fifty-one of this article; 
(iii) the provisions of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph shall 
not be applicable to the renewal or extension of a charter; 
and (iv) nothing in this sentence shall be construed to 
subject a charter school subject to the provisions of this 
paragraph or its employees to any collective bargaining 
agreement between any public school district and its 
employees or to make the employees of such charter school 
part of any negotiating unit at such school district. The 
charter school may, in its sole discretion, choose whether or 
not to offer the terms of any existing collective bargaining to 
school employees, (emphasis added) 
Thus, Education Law §2854(3)(b-1) requires, in certain circumstances, that the "same 
employee organization" that represents similar employees in the school district where a 
charter school is located, be deemed to represent a separate negotiating unit of similar 
employees in the charter school. The statute does not state that the employee organization 
must file a representation petition or obtain a showing of interest under the Act.. 
In the present case, the record needs to be clarified before we can reach the 
merits of NCS's exceptions. This is necessitated by ambiguities in the parties' stipulation 
of facts with respect to the employee organization that is asserting representational rights 
for NCS instructional employees pursuant to Education Law §2854(3)(b-1). 
The stipulation states that NYSUT representatives told an assembled group of 
NCS instructional employees that the "Niagara Charter School Instructional Staff 
Association, Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association/NYSUT/AFT (Association)" 
represents instructional staff of the Niagara Wheatfield School District. However, the 
stipulation does not state that NCS agrees that the Association referenced by NYSUT 
representatives during the meeting is the same employee organization representing 
instructional staff at the Niagara Wheatfield School District. In addition, the stipulation is 
unclear as to the specific Association that asserts representational rights under 
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Education Law §2854(3)(b-1) and that requested the commencement of collective 
negotiations with NCS. Under the stipulation, it is unclear whether the Niagara Charter 
School Instructional Staff Association is a subpart of the Niagara Wheatfield Teachers 
Association or a separate entity affiliated with NYSUT. Furthermore, the stipulation is 
silent as to whether NCS is located in the Niagara Wheatfield School District. Finally, 
the stipulation states that NCS maintains that NYSUT, as opposed to an affiliated 
Association, does not represent its instructional staff. 
In remanding the case for clarification, we have taken administrative notice that 
the parties' stipulation of facts in a prior related case explicitly stated that "[t]he 
employee organization representing instructional employees in the school district in 
which NCS is located is the Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
NEA, AFL-CIO" and that "[t]he employee organization seeking to represent instructional 
employees at NCS is the Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, 
AFL-CIO." In addition, the prior stipulation references a March 26, 2007 memorandum 
from NYSUT representatives to NCS demanding commencement of negotiations with 
the Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO.7 The 
earlier stipulation does not refer to the Niagara Charter School Instructional Staff 
Association. However, that stipulation was agreed to over a month before the filing of 
the present charge, and the identity of the employee organization asserting rights under 
the Education Law §2854(3)(b-1) and the right to engage in collective negotiations 
pursuant to §209-a.1(d) of the Act may have changed in the interim. 
As noted, Education Law §2854(3)(b-1) states that the "same employee 
organization" that represents similar employees in the school district where a charter 
7
 Niagara Charter School, supra, note 6, 40 PERB at 6613. 
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school is located is entitled to certain representational rights. The reference to Niagara 
Charter School Instructional Staff Association in the present stipulation, as well as its 
inclusion in the name of the charging party, creates an ambiguity that must be resolved 
before the Board can reach the merits of NCS's exceptions. 
We fully recognize the importance and value of parties entering into stipulations 
of facts. They are an economical and convenient means of eliminating or limiting the 
need for a hearing before an ALJ.8 However, parties retain the same level of 
responsibility and care for ensuring a complete record whether through a stipulation or 
through the presentation of evidence at an improper practice hearing. 
Based upon the foregoing, we remand the case to the ALJ for further processing 
aimed at clarifying the record consistent with our decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that this case is hereby remanded to the ALJ. 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
IJCMTW^ 
Jerome Lefko^/itz, Chairman u 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
City of Albany, 42 PERB 1J3005 (2009). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a motion, dated December 1, 2009, by Odessa 
E. Hunter (Hunter) requesting an extension of time to file exceptions, pursuant to §213.4 
of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
dated October 26, 2009, on an improper practice charge, as amended, filed by Hunter 
alleging that the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
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demonstrates extraordinary circumstances will we grant a motion to extend the period of 
time for a party to request an extension of time to file exceptions.1 Extraordinary 
circumstances can be established through the presentation of specific and detailed facts 
demonstrating that the failure to make a timely request for an extension was not the 
result of a neglectful error or the burdens from other obligations.2 
In the present case, Hunter fails to set forth sufficient and relevant facts 
demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. Her misreading of the clear and explicit 
notice accompanying the ALJ's decision, and her need for additional time to review the 
ALJ's decision, do not meet the high standard necessary to demonstrate extraordinary 
circumstances under §213.4 of the Rules, and our precedent applying that Rule. 
IT IS, THEREFORE.-ORDERED that Hunter's motion is denied. 
DATED: December 18, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole! Member 
1
 Onondaga Community Coll, 11 PERB P008 (1978). 
2
 Westbury Union Free Sch Dist (Handy), 12 PERB 1J3107 (1979); UFT (Gottlieb), 
13 PERBTJ3101 (1980); Bd of Educ of the City of New York (Barnett), 16 PERB 1J3051 
(1983); UFT (Thompson), 18 PERB 1J3014 (1985); CSEA (Adams), 28 PERB 1J3054 
(1995); County of Westchester, 28 PERB 1(4535 (1995). 
